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his paper deals with the effects of democracy and institutional setting on 
agricultural protection in 35 developed and developing countries during 1982- T 1992. Regression analysis is  conducted to test the effects of three alternative 
measures of democracy and two composite indices of the quality of institutions that 
protect and enforce property rights. After controlling for many other political and 
economic determinants of ap'cul tural  protection, the paper shows that  democracy 
afects protection positively, but it i s  not the level of democracy per  se that seems to 
matter. On the contrary there i s  strong evidence that  the quality of institutions that 
protect and enforce property rights is  a key determinant of agricultural protection. This 
empirical result is  robust to changes in institutional prosy,  country sample and 
statistical problems. 
1. Introduction 
In the last two decades there has been a notable body of literature dedicated to analysing 
the determinants of agricultural protection from a political economy perspective (see 
Swinnen and van der Zee, 1993, and de  Gorter and Swinnen, 1994, for recent surveys). 
Much of the analysis is empirical, and uses data of agricultural protection to find the most 
relevant political and economic factors affecting agricultural policy. A major shortcoming 
is that much of this literature does not deal with the actual institutional setting in which 
policy formation takes place (Beghin and Fafchamps, 1995), disregarding the nature of 
political and economic institutions that are themselves important determinants of both 
redistributive and public good agricultural policies. Institutional factors constrain, both 
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directly and indirectly, the decision-making process through their action on the level of 
competition in the political system and in conditioning the ability of groups to give 
weight to their interests (Olson, 1965; North, 1990). 
Some recent analyses that attempt to cover this gap can be found in the studies of 
Beghin and Kherallah (1994) and Beghin et al. (1996).1 They have shown that 
institutions matter, and suggest that the interaction between political institutions and 
agricultural protection is non-linear and non monotonic. For example, effort towards 
democracy results in higher protection, then rent dissipation occurs with more 
competitive political markets (Beghin and Kherallah, 1994). Despite the interesting 
results of these studies, many aspects of the interaction between institution and 
agricultural protection remain unclear. For example, the sign of the relationship 
between democracy and protection is theoretically uncertain. Moreover, there is no 
direct addressing of important institutional dimensions highlighted in the theoretical 
literature, such as institutions that protect and enforce property rights (North, 1990; 
Rausser, 1992). Finally, due to the frequently subjective nature of many political 
institution proxies, it is important to test whether the empirical regularities are robust 
to changes in specifications, country sample and institutional proxies. Some of these 
issues will be addressed in the present work. 
Following the work of Honma and Hayami (1986) and Beghin and JSherallah (1994) 
the present study takes an empirical approach based on quasi-reduced form estimation 
to analyse the cross-country time series consistency of the effects of democracy and 
institutional setting on agricultural protection. The period covered is from 1982 to 
1992 and 35 countries - 13 OECD (counting the EU as one country), 18 developing 
and NIC and 4 CEEC - are considered. Similar data were used in a preliminary analysis 
on this topic in Olper (1999). 
The empirical specification uses several alternative measures to capture the level of 
democratic pluralism, and different proxies of institution quality that protect and 
enforce property rights. The objective is to identify, and separate, the potential impact 
of these "different" institutional dimensions on agricultural policy. This can be 
important because, as stressed by de Gorter and Swinnen, recent literature linking 
political institution factors to macroeconomics government behaviour and economic 
growth suggests that focusing on political regimes (authoritarianism versus democracy) 
may be too simple to explain differences in performance and governance. A crucial 
issue is the credible commitment of government with respect to property rights and the 
enforcement of commercial rule (de Gorter and Swinnen, 1995: 281). Thus, it is not 
the level of democracy per se that matters, but other institutional dimensions, such as 
rules of law, bureaucratic quality and government credibility. The results reported in 
this paper strongly support this. 
After controlling for many other political and economic determinants of agricultural 
protection, it can be seen that agricultural protection shows a positive, but weak, link 
with the level of democracy, and exhibits a strong inverse U-shaped pattern with the 
quality of institutions that protect and enforce property rights. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 gives 
some preliminary consideration to possible links between democracy and agricultural 
See also the analysis of Bates (198s) on the food policy patterns in African countries. 
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protection, derives estimating equations, describes the data and reports empirical 
results. Section 3 reports and discusses the link between proxy of institution quality that 
protects and enforces property rights and agricultural protection. Finally, Section 4 
discusses the implication of our findings and draws some conclusions. 
2. Democracy and agricultural protection 
Theoretical and empirical considerations 
From a theoretical point of view the relationship between democracy and redistributive 
policies, such as agricultural protection, is an intriguing matter. All things being equal, 
why should the agricultural sector in a democratic regime be better than in an autocratic? 
According to Przeworsky (1991) one of the main differences between democratic and 
authoritarian regimes lies in the level, in the political process, of free participation by 
independent organisations. Authoritarian regimes abhor independent organisations, 
and either incorporate them into centralised control or repress them by force. Starting 
from this there is the possibility of developing two contrasting viewpoints about whether 
agricultural protection is more, or less, likely to occur under democratic or authoritarian 
regimes. 
One view is that the voices of farmers may be better heard in an electoral democracy 
(Lindert, 1991) where the interest groups are free to compete for political rents. This is 
because the high level of political rights permits farm groups to agitate for above-market 
rents. Instead authoritarian regimes, better able to discourage rent-seeking activities by 
interest groups, tax or do not support their agricultural sectors. These arguments suggest 
that in democracy, agricultural protection could be increasing. 
Contrasting the above mentioned view is the probability of governments passing 
inefficient policy to benefit specific interest groups or "insiders", a probability that is 
actually higher under authoritarian regimes. Indeed, an important difference between 
democratic and authoritarian regimes is the degree of outsider influence. In a well- 
functioning democracy outsiders vote and impose some limits on what narrower interest 
groups can achieve, while in a less democratic environment the government needs to 
worry only about groups that have real power (Banerji and Ghanem, 1995). Thus it could 
be suggested that agricultural policy transfers could decrease in democracy, but the 
arguments are also consistent with a non-linear or non-monotonic relationship. Thus, 
from this brief discussion it emerges that, theoretically, the net effect of democracy on 
agricultural protection is of an uncertain sign; a result that, in general, agrees with the 
existing empirical evidence summarised below. 
Support for a positive link between democracy and agricultural transfer is provided by 
many national examples and, interestingly, by empirical evidence inside and outside the 
agricultural economic literature. For example, literature that has analysed the 
relationship between democratic political regimes and government spending has shown 
that more pluralistic systems are normally associated with a greater budget deficit (see for 
example, Grilli et al., 1991). Thus, i t  can be inferred that part of this deficit is due to farm 
policy redistribution. Direct evidence can be found in Lindert (1991). In a cross-country 
analysis he found a positive relationship when democracy (captured by dummy variables) 
was associated with rapid agricultural decline. Moreover, in an analysis of agricultural 
protection in Belgium, Swinnen et al. (2000a) found that more political rights, such as the 
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introduction of the Singular General Voting Scheme (“One Man, One Vote”), increased 
agricultural protection. At the same time, however, they found that other reforms that 
increase political rights have had no substantial effects on protection. The logical 
interpretation of this finding suggested by the authors is that only those political reforms 
which induce a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural interest led 
to an increase in agricultural protection (p. 24). 
This latest argument may explain the numerous examples in the empirical literature 
that support a decreasing or non-linear relationship between democracy and agricultural 
protection. Cases of non-democratic (or less democratic) countries that protect 
agricultural sectors can be found in Taiwan, Korea, Turkey, Chile, and Nigeria during the 
late 1970s and in 1980 (see Tyers and Anderson, 1992; USDA, 1994) and in almost all ex- 
Communist countries (OECD, 1998). Moreover, democracies where agricultural sectors 
are discriminated against, or where there is no substantial protection, lend further 
credence to this view. Evidence can be found not only in less stable democracies like 
Argentina and Colombia, but also in long-stable democracies like India in the developing 
world and Australia and New Zealand in the developed one. 
More general evidences of a decreasing or non-linear relationship can be found in 
cross-country analyses. Swinnen et al. (2000b) found that moving from low to medium 
political rights reduces protection, but that a further increase in political rights has no 
substantial effects on agricultural protection. An opposite, but still non-linear behaviour, 
is shown in Beghin and Kherallah (1994) and Beghin el al. (1996). They found support 
for an inverse U-shaped pattern: dominant party systems are associated with more 
transfers than pluralist systems, which are in turn associated with more transfers than no- 
party systems. 
Finally, as in the above discussion, empirical growth literature also emphasises ambiguity 
in the relationship between democracy and economic growth (see Przeworsky and 
Limongi, 1993, for a recent critical survey). Some studies have found positive effects of 
political rights on growth, but almost all fail to find a significant strong correlation. Barro 
(1997) suggests that this may be because the relation is non-linear: extensions of 
democracy appear to be beneficial only up to a threshold point. However, the same 
author concludes that democracy and political rights do not seem to be a critical factor 
in explaining economic performance. 
Model, data and measures 
The basic multivariate model to test the effects of democracy on agricultural protection is 
where the subscripts refer to country i and time t; p denotes the level of protection and 
support accorded by the government to agricultural sectors; x is a political variable 
designed to capture the level of democracy; y is a vector of control variables (taken from 
the literature) that measure economic and political conditions; u is the error. The data 
set comprises 35 countries over the period from 1982 to 1992: in all there are 330 
observations. 
The dependent variable is the aggregated producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) as a 
percentage of gross farm income. Thus it measures the percentage of farm income that 
comes from all government programmes. The PSE includes border measures, output 
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subsidies and direct payments as well as primary and intermediate input subsidies, 
structural policies and the effect of indirect macroecon,omic policies such as the 
overvalued exchange rate (Webb et al., 19.90). The rationale for the choice of this variable 
is twofold: firstly, i t  is available for a quite large cross-section of countries due to the 
relative simplicity of its computation; secondly, measuring the level of total income 
transfer from consumer/taxpayer to the agricultural sector appears appropriate to test 
political economy hypotheses.? 
Three alternative political variables are used to test the impact of democracy on 
agricultural protection. First, in line with the study of Beghin et al. (1996), we measure the 
degree of pluralism or the diversity of political parties using three dummy variables: 
multiparty democracy (SYSI), dominant party systems (SYS2) and authoritarian regimes 
(SKU). Second, following Barro (1997), we use an indicator of political rights (PL) 
compiled by Gastil (1982-83). This is a subjective index that classifies countries into 7 
categories, from the best (1) to the worst (7), on the basis of several dimensions such as the 
existence of free and fair elections, rights to participate in the political process, and so on. 
Finally, an index of democratisation (DEM) proposed by Vanhanen (1990) is used. This is 
based on proxies of competition and participation in the political system, compiled from 
electoral data. DEM is not a dummy variable, it varies in continuum both across countries 
and over time, from 0 to 46.2 index points in our sample. Thus DEM offers the possibility 
of detecting differences in the degree of pluralism of democratic countries.3 
The other explanatory variables included to check for other political economy factors are: 
a factor endowment ratio to proxy for agricultural comparative advantage (FACTR); 
agricultural share in employment (EMF'SHR) and in GDP (AGSHR) to account for 
differences in economic structure and industrialization; the per capita income (CDPC) to 
account for residual differences in development; the agricultural export value as a share of 
the value of total export (TAXI), and the share of income tax on total tax revenues (TAX2) 
to capture government tax collection constrains (Beghin and Kherallah, 1994). Such a 
choice of control variables is in accordance with the most recent empirical findings in this 
research area, taking into account data availability and is, in general, a less parsimonious 
choice than in previous studies (see, for example Honma and Hayami, 1986; Searker et al., 
1993; Beghin el al., 1996)d. Appendix A reports summary statistics and the data source of 
the explanatory variables described above, Appendix B lists the country sample. 
Empirical results 
Table 1 shows the OLS regressions of four specifications: a basic specification that does not 
include the democracy variable; three different specifications that include the effects of the 
democracy variables described above. Let us briefly analyse the basic specification 
' For similar analyses that use different protection indices, also in comparison with the PSEmeasure, see Beghin 
and Kherallah (1994) and Olper (1998). 
Note that both theoretical and empirical evidence suggest differences in the public finance outcome between 
democracies with a different degree of pluralism, such as presidential vs. parliamentary systems (see Tabellini, 
2000; Grilli et al., 1991). 
Other determinants suggested by the literature, such as the agricultural term of trade, were tried but without 
significant results. Regression was also run including as proxy of comparative advantage the ratio of agricultural 
labour productivity over manufacturing labour productivity, instead of FACTR (see Hanma and Hayami, 1986). 
The resulting coefficient was negative and statistically significant as in previous analyses. In the final regressions 
we prefer the specification with FACTR due to the potential endogenity issue of the productivity ratio and 
collinearity problems with TAXI. However, the results are both qualitatively and quantitatively the same. For a 
more extensive description and justification of the explanatory variables described above, see Olper (1999). 
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(regression (i)) .  Overall the empirical results are very close to the previous studies. All the 
“traditional” political and economic determinants of the protection levels enter in the 
equation with their expected sign and are, for the most part, statistically significant at 1 or 
5 per cent levels. Protection increases in countries with a comparative disadvantage in 
agriculture (Honma and Hayami, 1986). Protection is negatively related to the relative 
dimensions of the agricultural sector as measured by farm number (EMPSHR), in line with 
the collective action hypothesis (Olson, 1965). However, the relation is positive and 
significant when the economic role of agriculture is measured as the share of GDP 
(ACSHR), a result that is frequently found in the most recent empirical analyses that use 
specifications very close to this study (see Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Swinnen, el al., 
2000b). Moreover, protection is positively associated with economic development (GDPPR), 
in line with the so-called development paradox. Finally, export revenue tax diversification 
(TAXI) and tax instrument diversification (TAXZ), are respectively negatively and positively 
related to agricultural protection; nevertheless the coefficient of tax instrument 
diversification is insignificant. Thus there is little support for the hypothesis, suggested by 
Beghin el al. (1996), that when income taxation becomes more prevalent taxation on 
agricultural exports decreases. 
Table 1: Effects of Democracy on Agricultural Protection 
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Intercept 
Comparative advantage (FACTR) 
Employment share (EMPSHR) 
Agricultural GDP share (ACSHR) 
Agricultural Export Share (TAXI) 
Share of income tax (TAX2) 
Real percapita GDP (GDPC) 
Pluralist party system (SYSI) 
Dominant party system (SYS2) 
Political rights (PL) 
Index of democratization (DEM) 
20.85 
(1.89) 
-86.78 
(5.76) 
(3.56) 
1.371 
(2.42) 
-0.372 
(2.72) 
0.143 
(1.41) 
0.003 
(5.01) 
-1.053 
10.07 
(0.88) 
(5.34) 
-82.76 
-1.074 
(4.04) 
1.674 
(3.31) 
-0.450 
(3.11) 
0.129 
( 1.28) 
0.002 
(3.73) 
21.07 
(3.71) 
13.24 
(0.88) 
33.56 
(2.27) 
-85.65 
(5.86) 
-1.044 
(3.59) 
1.489 
(2.64) 
-0.41 1 
(3.03) 
0.123 
(1.24) 
0.003 
(3.35) 
19.33 
(1.75) 
-86.06 
(5.73) 
-1.047 
(3.53) 
1.401 
(2.47) 
-0.386 
(2.81) 
0.151 
(1.48) 
0.003 
(3.95) 
-3.019 
(1.86) 
0.249 
( 1.80) 
Adj. Rz 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 
No. obs. 330 330 330 330 
Notes: Dependent variable PSE. Parentheses ( ) give the absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent f-statistics of 
White (1980). 
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The estimated effects of the three democracy variables on the full sample of 35 countries 
are reported at the bottom of Table 1, regressions from (ii) to (iv). If the political dummy 
variable is used as an indicator of democracy (Column (ii)), only the coefficient of SYSl is 
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level, suggesting that protection is higher in most 
pluralist systems. If PL (Column (iii)) or DEM (Column (iv)) is used as the democracy 
variable the regression coefficient is respectively negative and positive, in line with the 
above result, but of less statistical significance (10 per cent level). There is no evidence of a 
non-linear relationship: e.g. the coefficient of SYS2 is not statistically different from zero. 
Similar results are obtained if DEMor PL enter in the equation in a quadratic form. In these 
cases the t-values of both the linear and square coefficients are insignificant. 
Note also that using DEM as the democracy variable does not improve the performance 
of the regression. Thus, there is no evidence that in democratic countries the differences 
in the degree of pluralism affect the level of agricultural protection. Finally, comparing 
basic regression (i) with regressions from (i i )  to (iv) reveals that the inclusion of the 
democracy variables, despite their coefficients being statistically significant, does not add 
significant information to the model.5 
This preliminary examination of the  link between democracy and agricultural protection 
suggests that protection increases in democracy and with political rights; however we 
cannot conclude from this evidence that political rights play a critical role in agricultural 
support, a result that is not new in the literature (see Swinnen et aL, 2000b). Thus, on 
returning to the discussion of the previous section it  can be seen that these results provide 
only weak support for the hypothesis that high levels of political rights give farm groups a 
more sensitive political environment for their rent-seeking activities. However the finding 
does not mean that authoritarian regimes are immune to rent-seeking behaviour, but, more 
simply, that the groups who have real power in these countries are outside the rural sectors.6 
A possible explanation of the weak effect of democracy on agricultural protection can be 
found in the Swinnen et al. (2000a) hypothesis, which stresses that only those political 
reforms that determine a significant shift in the political balance towards agricultural 
interests give an increase in agricultural protection. However, the data do not support the 
non-linear relationship between democracy and protection often found in this literature 
(see below) .7 
A major shortcoming of this conclusion could be due to other omitted factors correlated 
to democracy levels, that could bias estimated coefficients. The following section also looks 
into this point. 
3. Quality of institution and agricultural protection 
Hypothesis, data and measures 
From the perspective of political economy, few would dispute that the security of 
The Fstatistics for basic regression ( i )  versus regressions that include democracy variables is always lpwer than 
the critical &value at both the 5 and 10 per cent levels. 
For example, Banerji and Ghanem find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that in an authoritarian 
setting, urban labour and owners of capital tend to have greater relative power, since the majority of rural and 
informal workers are not allowed to vote and cannot organise urban unrest and demonstrations to bring down 
the government (1995: 24). ’ Nevertheless, the non-linear evidences found in the previous cross-country studies did not go in the same 
direction. In particular, Beghin and Kherallah (1994) and Beghin el at. (1996) find an inverted U-shaped 
relation between democracy and agricultrual protection, and Swinnen el nl. (2000) find a U-shaped relation. 
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property and contractual rights, and the efficiency with which governments manage 
the provision of public goods, are key determinants of agricultural 
taxation/subsidisation patterns and, more in general, of agricultural and economic 
growth (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995). The institutional 
setting - determined by the legal, bureaucratic and regulatory system - directly and 
indirectly constrains the decision making process through its action on the competitive 
level in the political system, and in conditioning the ability of groups to represent their 
interests. This is because institutions define the structure of participant incentive and 
opportunity, conditioning both economic and political exchange (de Gorter and 
Swinnen, 1995; Rausser, 1992; North, 1990). 
Nevertheless, due in particular to limitations in data, the empirical examination of the 
link between institutions and agricultural protection has been largely restricted to 
qualitative country studies (e.g. Bates, 1989), reducing the possibility of a robust and 
more general test of the hypothesis. The notable exception to the above is in the work 
of Beghin and Kherallah (1994) and Beghin et al. (1996); they capture the role of 
institutional dimensions other than political regimes by the indicators of civil liberties 
compiled by Gastil. However, the limitation of these indices as a proxy of the security 
of property and contractual rights and government credibility is well known in the most 
recent empirical growth literature (see Knack and Keefer, 1995; Barro, 1997). In fact, 
the Gastil civil liberties index is an aggregate measure, compiled without the explicit 
aim of measuring the security of property and contractual rights; moreover, it is highly 
correlated with the democracy variables used in the previous section.8 Thus, the use of 
this index hinders any possibility of capturing any effects other than differences in the 
degree of democracy. Moreover, i t  is important to note that for 12 of the 13 OECD 
countries covered in this study, the Gasti1 index of civil liberties is equal to one (as for 
SYSl and PL), precluding any possibility of capturing differences in the security of 
property rights and government credibility of around 1/3 of the sample.9 
To overcome these limitations, and to analyse in greater depth the empirical 
relationships between institutions and agricultural policy, use was made of indicators 
compiled by two private international investment risk services: International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BEN). These two 
sources provide detailed ratings for large samples on desegregated dimensions of 
property rights closely related to those institutions emphasised by theoretical work 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995). From ICRG use was made of five different institutional 
measures. Three - Expropriation Risk, Rule of Low and Gouernment Repudiation - can be 
interpreted as direct proxies for the security of property and contract rights and 
government credibility. In countries that score low on these dimensions, the private 
actors cannot count on government and legal systems to respect contracts and property 
rights. Thus investment in economic and rent-seeking activities will be low because of a 
limited expected return and high transaction costs. For example, in agriculture, land 
The correlation coeffcents between the Gastil civil liberty index and the democratic variables are -0.76 with 
SYSl, 0.93 with PI!+ and -0.85 with DEM. 
For this reason it  is not surprising that in the regressions presented in section 3.2, the inclusion of the Catil 
index of civil liberties is never significant neither in the linear nor the quadratic form, or when included as 
categorical dummies as in Beghin and Kherallah (1994). For a critical discussion on the limit of the Gastil 
indices as proxy of the security property and contracted rights, also in comparison with the proxies used in this 
work, see Knack and Keefer (1995). 
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tenure policies can be critical because the lack of clear land rights and institutions that 
make property rights effective can induce low levels of lobbying for farm policies 
(Beghin and Fafchamps, 1995). The other two institutional dimensions - Quality of 
Bureaucracy and Corruption in Government - are proxy for the general efficiency found in 
government services and their immunity from rent-seeking behaviour. Countries 
scoring low in these dimensions have a bureaucracy that lacks procedural clarity and 
technical competence, and it is likely that criteria other than efficiency will be 
introduced into the determination of government policies and in the allocation of 
public goods (Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
The B E N  measures used in this analysis are Contract Enforceability, Nationalization 
Potential and Bureauuatic Delays which are similar to the ICRG variables described above, 
and Infrastructure Quality that does not have analogues in the ICRG data set. This last 
variable may be interpreted as a proxy of the efficiency with which government 
allocates public goods. Moreover, because this variable assesses the quality of 
communication and transportation infrastructure, i t  is a direct proxy of the transaction 
costs inherent in farm group activities (Olson, 1985). 
Following earlier works that use these measures (see, for example, Knack and Keefer, 
1995; Svensson, 1998) the five ICRG variables and the four BEN variables were 
aggregated through simple addition to form two composite indices of the quality of 
institutions that protect and enforce contractual and property rights."' This 
arrangement is necessary to overcome correlation problems among separate 
indicators, with the consequent risk of multicollinearity, and in order to avoid omitting 
any of these institutional dimensions from the equation. It is important to note that 
there is no significant change in the results reported below when individual 
components of these indices are used. 
Empirical results 
The empirical results of the effect of institution quality on agricultural protection are 
reported in Table 2. If the ZCRGindicator is entered linearly into the regressions of Table 
1, then the resulting coefficient is positive and statistically significant. However, the results 
shown in Table 2 (Columns from (i) to (iii)) allow for a quadratic relationship. Indeed, 
if the ICRG is entered in a quadratic form the linear coefficients, and its square, are both 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, and the explanatory power of the models is 
higher. Thus, to economise on space, we have reported only the last results. 
Very similar results are found if the BEIUindex, not ICRG, is used as the indicator of 
institution quality (see Columns from (iv) to (vi)). In this case the sample drops from 35 
to 29 countries due to the lack of BERTdata. The main difference in this case is that if the 
BERTindicator is entered linearly into the regressions, the resulting coefficient is negative 
but statistically insignificant. However, both coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent 
level in the quadratic version reported in Table 2. 
The institution quality variables are not only highly statistically significant, but also have 
strong explanatory power. Using the beta coefficient to determine which variable 
lo In general, the correlation between investor service proxies and the democracy variables is relatively low (or 
not so high), indicating that these institutional variables contain different and additional information. The 
Coefficients are: 0.54, -0.63 and 0.74 for ICRG, and 0.46, -0.59 and 0.62 for B W ,  with respect to SYSl ,  PL and 
DEM respectively. 
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contributes the most to the regression, we find that both ICRGand BERIhave the highest 
explanatory power.1' The beta coefficients for ICRG in the regressions of Table 2 have, on 
average, a value of 2.90 for the linear term and -2.81 for the quadratic term. The 
importance of this effect can be seen by comparing these values with the beta coefficient 
of the agricultural GDP share (AGSHR) or the level of development (GDPC}, that have the 
greatest explanatory power after ICRG. The beta coefficient for these variables has an 
absolute value never higher then 0.40, showing that ICRG is the most important variable 
in explaining protection. There is a similar story with regard to the BERIindicator. Its beta 
coefficient is on average 0.73 for the linear term and -0.80 for the quadratic. Thus, BERI 
performs less well than ICRG, but still exhibits a beta coefficient higher than the other 
control variables. 
Table 2: Effects of Quality of Institutions on Agricultural Protection 
ICRG BERI 
Independent variables (i) (ii) (iii) ( iv) (v) (vi) 
FA CTR 
EMPSHR 
A GSHR 
TAX1 
TAX2 
GDPC 
SYSI 
SYS2 
PL 
DEM 
Quality of institutions 
Quality of institutions' 
-66.51 
(5.43) 
-0.866 
(3.72) 
2.293 
(4.14) 
-0.603 
(4.73) 
0.162 
(1.64) 
0.003 
(3.47) 
18.78 
(3.58) 
26.35 
(1.98) 
13.97 
(5.14) 
(4.83) 
-0.819 
-69.77 
(6.35) 
-0.730 
(2.95) 
2.006 
(3.30) 
-0.600 
(4.93) 
0.159 
(1.65) 
0.003 
(3.62) 
4.888 
(2.75) 
14.56 
(4.85) 
-0.202 
(4.65) 
-70.21 
(4.21) 
-0.717 
(2.83) 
1.952 
(3.21) 
-0.585 
(4.94) 
0.229 
(2.30) 
0.004 
(4.69) 
0.687 
(3.86) 
15.28 
(5.11) 
-0.219 
(5.01) 
-60.43 
(8.73) 
-0.591 
(2.51) 
0.848 
(2.01) 
-0.656 
(7.57) 
0.206 
(2.43) 
0.002 
(3.87) 
16.72 
(3.52) 
(0.16) 
-1.105 
16.87 
-0.921 
(3.35) 
(3.79) 
-62.08 
(8.62) 
(2.48) 
0.722 
(1.78) 
-0.615 
(7.01) 
0.205 
(2.32) 
0.003 
(3.99) 
-0.568 
-1.437 
(1.36) 
17.79 
-0.99 
(4.30) 
(3.73) 
-61.43 
(8.56) 
-0.569 
(2.47) 
0.679 
(1.70) 
-0.596 
(6.84) 
0.220 
(2.46) 
0.003 
(3.82) 
0.21 1 
(1.50) 
14.98 
(2.73) 
(3.15) 
-0.842 
Adj. R2 
No. obs. 
0.55 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.55 
330 330 330 277 277 277 
Notes: Dependent variable PSE. Parentheses ( ) give the absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent 
t -  statistics of White (1980). Constants not reported. 
l 1  The beln coefficients were calculated by dividing the standardized estimated coefficients by the standard 
deviation of the dependent variables, so as to 'purge' the estimated coefficients of their dependence on 
measurement units. 
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Now let us turn to the interpretation of this empirical evidence. A positive coefficient in 
the linear term and a negative coefficient in the square suggests that protection increases 
with institution quality at low levels of this dimension, but the relation turns negative 
once a moderate amount of institution quality has been achieved. One way to interpret 
this empirical evidence is that in countries where the institution is poor in protecting and 
enforcing property rights, any improvement in these dimensions will allow an increase in 
farm political pressure due to the reduction of lobbying costs and the increase in 
expected return from rent-seeking activities. However, when a country has already 
achieved a moderate level of institution efficiency, any further increase in the quality of 
institution reduces protection (and distortion), probably because the dominant effect in 
this new setting comes from an increase in the competition between lobbies and in the 
ability of government to select more efficient policies. Thus, there is evidence that 
credible institutions that protect rules and property rights, reducing uncertainty, have an 
effect in minimizing deadweight losses and rent-seeking opportunities (Beghin and 
Fafchamps, 1995). 
The inclusion of institution quality variables also affects the performance of the 
democracy indicators discussed in Section 2. However, the results are mixed in this 
regard. The magnitude of the effects of the democracy indices increases in the 
specifications with ICRGand its square. For example, in these specifications DEM and PL 
are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, and their coefficients increase in 
magnitude. Thus, there is some evidence that the coefficients of the democracy 
indicators reported in Table 1 are biased. However, in the specifications with BERIwe find 
an opposite effect. In fact, the coefficients of the democracy indices are now smaller and 
PL and DEM are insignificant at the conventional statistical level.12 Finally, it is important 
to note that the three democracy measures have an absolute beta coefficient never higher 
then 0.17, reinforcing the conclusion of the previous section on the weak effects of 
democracy on agricultural protection. 
In summary, even though there are some mixed effects, probably due to some 
multicolinearity problems, the conclusions of the interplay between democracy and 
agricultural protection suggest that democracy affects protection positively, but it is not 
the level of democracy per se that seems to matter. On the contrary there is strong 
evidence that the quality of institutions conditioning the economic and political 
incentives of the actors, is a key determinant of agricultural protection. 
Sensitivity analysis 
In this subsection we briefly discuss three possible problems with the regressions 
discussed above. A first problem can be derived by reverse causation leading to 
simultaneity bias, as suggested by Beghin and Kherallah (1994). The three right-hand 
side variables, AGSHR, TAXl and TAX2, are the best candidates for potential endogenity 
problems. Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 3 show results from two-stage least-square (2SLS) 
regressions for two representative specifications that include PL as the democratic 
indicator.13 The instruments include AGSHR, TAXl and TAX2 all lagged two years, and 
'* Note that these results are not due to the change in the country sample. Indeed, if we use ICRGand its square 
instead of BEH in the sample of 29 countries used for B E N  regressions, the coefficients of DEM and PL 
increase, but only the former is statistically significant. 
The specification with DEM or political system dummy SYSl and SYS2 give similar results, thus to save space, 
we have not reported these regressions. 
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the other right-hand side variables of the specification (ii) and (iii) of Table 2. As can be 
seen, * the parameter estimates suggest that our results and conclusions are not 
substan tially affected by endogenity problems. 
The two other possible econometric problems derive from the cross-sectional time-series 
nature of our data. Indeed, OLS estimation of Tables 1 and 2 assume that the error terms, 
uiL, are independent and identically distributed. However, this assumption is open to 
question for pooled data, which may exhibit correlation of the error term over time for 
a given country, as well as cross-section effects at a given point in time. 
To check if serial correlation affects our results, we re-run regressions using the Newey- 
West correction, that gives consistent estimates of the covariance matrix in the presence 
of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). The results of 
this correction are reported in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3. In general, the results 
for specification with ICRG and its square are essentially unchanged and all the estimated 
Table 3: Regression of the Sensitivity Analysis 
2sLs N-W correction Fixed-effects 
Independent variables ( i )  (ii) (iii) ( iv) (v) 
FACTR 
EMPSHR 
AGSHR 
TAXI 
TAX2 
GDPC 
PL 
ICRG 
ICRCSQ 
BERI 
-77.2 
(6.43) 
-0.623 
(2.26) 
2.023 
(3.30) 
-0.417 
(3.21) 
0.103 
(0.95) 
0.004 
(3.90) 
4.908 
(2.47 
12.39 
(3.35) 
-0.169 
(3.21) 
BERISQ 
Regional dummies NO 
-60.37 
(6.82) 
-0.306 
(1 5 0 )  
0.453 
(1.24) 
-0.668 
(6.50) 
0.177 
0.003 
(3.62) 
(1.48) 
(1.91) 
-2.130 
18.39 
(3.49) 
-0.987 
(3.74) 
NO 
-69.77 
(4.26) 
-0.730 
(1.72) 
2.006 
(2.35) 
-0.600 
(3.41) 
0.159 
(0.97) 
0.003 
(2.16) 
4.888 
(1.79) 
14.56 
(3.35) 
-0.202 
(3.18) 
NO 
-62.08 
(4.81) 
-0.568 
(1.56) 
0.722 
(1.25) 
-0.615 
(3.82) 
0.205 
(1.34) 
0.003 
(2.34) 
(0.83) 
-1.437 
17.80 
(2.04) 
-0.99 
(2.30) 
NO 
-62.41 
(5.22) 
-0.446 
(1.39) 
2.556 
(3.71) 
(6.17) 
0.113 
(1.20) 
0.003 
(2.71) 
(2.94) 
16.22 
(4.58) 
-0.220 
(4.08) 
-0.781 
-5.576 
YES 
44.32 
(7.43) 
-0.046 
(0.18) 
1.989 
(3.98) 
(9.25) 
0.234 
(2.55) 
0.002 
(2.56) 
-1.301 
(1.30) 
-0.758 
22.49 
(4.71) 
-0.892 
(3.83) 
YES - 
Adj. R2 (a) ( a) 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.67 
No. obs. 260 219 330 277 330 277 
Notes: Dependent variable PSE. Parentheses ( ) give the absolute heteroskedasticityKonsistent c statistics of White 
(1980) in regressions . ( i ) ,  ( i i ) ,  (v) and (vi), and the heteroskedasticity-seriakorrelationionsistent &statistic of 
Newey and West (1987) in regressions (iii) and (iv). Regional futedeffects and constants not reported. 
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coefficients remain statistically significant at the 5 and 10 per cent levels. In the 
specification with BERIand its square, the coefficients of EMPSHRand AGSHR have their 
expected signs but the t-values are behind the conventional statistical level. Nevertheless, 
both the BERIcoefficient and its square remain significant at the 5 per cent level, so our 
conclusions regarding the significant non-linearity effect of BERI are still valid. 
What is more difficult is to testwhether our results are affected by individual effects due 
to the cross-sectional nature of the data. The quasi time invariant of the institutional 
proxies complicates the empirical examination as it is not possible to adopt a fixed-effect 
framework using country-specific dummies. A rough test to check whether individual 
effects affect the results to any degree is to use regional dummies. We estimated the 
previous specifications using regional dummies related to: Latin America, Africa, Asia 
(India and China), Korea, ex-Communist and the OECD countries. The results of these 
specifications are reported in Table 3, columns (v) and (vi). When ‘regional dummies 
(base “region” = OECD) are included, the results are similar to the regressions in Table 
2 (columns (ii) and (v)), in the sense that almost all the estimated coefficients remain 
statistically significant with their expected sign. Thus, country individual effects appear to 
have little effect on our results, cetm’s paribus. The only notable exception to this 
conclusion is the coefficient of EMPSHR, that is now negative but statistically 
insignificant. Thus we have only partial empirical support for the so-called “paradox of 
number” suggested by Olson (1985). 
In the specification with ZCRG and its square, the dummies for Asia and the African 
countries show a significantly negative effect whereas for Korea it is positive. On the other 
hand, in the specification with B E N  and its square, all the regional dummies are found 
to be significant, with a positive coefficient for the ex-Communist countries, Korea and 
Latin America, and a negative one for Asia and the African countries. Finally, note also 
that in the BERI regression, if regional dummies are added, the increase in the 
explanatory power of the model is greater (compare column (vi), Table 3, with column 
(v), Table 2).  Thus, in line with the evidence of the previous section, these results 
reinforce the conclusion that ICRG is a better indicator to capture the institutional 
dimension that affects agricultural policy. 
4. Conclusion 
The aims of this paper were to analyse the link between agricultural protection and 
political institutions, with the objective of clarifying and separating the role played by 
democracy and the quality of .institutions that protect and enforce property and 
contractual rights. The empirical finding offers support for two main conclusions. First, 
after controlling for agricultural comparative advantage, economic structure and 
development, and tax collection constraints, it can be seen that the level of protection is 
higher in more pluralistic and democratic countries. However, democracy does not seem 
a crucial factor in explaining protection because its explanatory power is low and the 
statistical significance is not so robust to changes in specification. While this result is 
rather different with respect to some previous empirical studies, it is important to note that 
we find a positive relationship between political rights and protection using three different 
democracy indicators. Moreover, the fact that using a continuum indicator of democracy, 
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such as DEM, does not change the relationship, suggests that “further” democratisation or 
differences in the degree of pluralism do not affect the level of agricultural protection. 
Indirectly, this result gives some credence to the Swinnen et. al. (2000a) view, which 
conditions the effect of an increase in political rights on agricultural protection, to the shift 
in Ihe political balance towards farmers induced by political reforms. 
Second, and this is most interesting, the quality of the institutions that protect and 
enforce property rights is an important determinant of agricultural 
taxation/subsidisation patterns, showing a strong non-linearity effect: at low levels of 
these dimensions an increase in institution quality enhances protection (or reduces 
taxation) but the relation turns negative once a moderate amount of institution quality 
has been attained. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis shows that this empirical result is 
robust to changes ,in institutional proxy, country sample and statistical problems. 
This empirical finding supports the idea that it is the nature of public institutions, 
through their action on the incentive structure and in conditioning the level of 
transaction costs, that is a critical element in the “performance” of the policy-making 
process. In other words, good rules of the game and government credibility minimising 
rent-seeking opportunities allow a more efficient policy outcome (Beghin and 
Fafchamps, 1995). 
A direct implication of these findings is that creating and reforming political institutions 
that protects and enforces property rights in developing countries should be an 
important priority in the agenda for policy reform. However, this policy recommendation 
could be useless when we recognise that i t  is the same forces that shape public policy that, 
in the long-run, also affect institutions (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995). We are a still long 
way from understanding the complex interaction between institution, policy outcome 
and performance. 
However, if the property rights structure is a key determinant of farm policy distortion, 
one way to further investigate this line of research is to look at the factors affecting the 
persistence of inefficient institutions, and to connect them through simple analytical 
models to policy outcomes. An example in this direction can be found in the literature 
that has incorporated stylised notions of property rights and rent-seeking into formal 
models (see, for example Svensson, 1998). The Svensson model shows the relationship 
between socio-political instability and government incentive to fully protect property 
rights through legal reform, and the effect of the said property rights on investment and 
growth. Empirical tests strongly support the casual link of the models. Thus, an extension 
of the analysis of the interplay between institution and agricultural policy in the above 
mentioned directions could offer an interesting insight into this research field. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definition, Data Source and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition and source Mean Std. Dev. 
PSE:  
FACTR: 
EMPSHR : 
Producer subsidy equivalent. Source: USDA and OECD. 
Ratio of agricultural land per farm worker to real GDP per 
capita. Source: FA0 and World Bank. 
Ratio of total active people in agriculture to total labour force in 
AGSHR : 
TAX1 : 
TAX2 : 
GDPC: 
S Y S l :  
SYSB: 
SYS3 : 
PL : 
DEM : 
ICRG : 
BERI: 
the economy. Source: FAO. 
Ratio of agricultural value added to total GDP. Source: World 
Bank. 
Ratio of total agricultural export to total merchandise export. 
Source: USDA 
Taxes on income and corporate profit as a share of total tax 
revenue. Source: World Bank. 
Real per capita GDP in international dollars. Source: World 
Bank. 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 for multiparty system and 
0 otherwise. &om Beghin and Kherallah (1994). 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 for dominant party system 
and 0 otherwise, from Begbin and Kherallah (1994). 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 for one party and no-party 
system and 0 otherwise, from Beghin and Kherallah (1994). 
Gastil index of Political Ffighta. Source: Freedom House: 
http://www.hedomhouae.org/. 
Index of democratisation, from Vanhanen (1990). 
Index of institutional quality, sum of: r u l e  of low, corruption 
in government, quality of bureacracy, expropriation of private 
investment, repudiation of contracts. Source: ICRG. New 
York. see Knack and Keefer (1995) for a detailed definition. 
Index of institutional quality, sum of: bureaucratic delays. 
nationalisation potential, contract enforceability. 
iafrastructure quality. Source: the data were provided by 
Stephen Knack, see Knack and Keefer (1995) for a detailed 
definition. 
17.62 55.76 
0.14 0.19 
28.04 25.75 
11.58 11.10 
20.00 22.59 
31.28 16.36 
7,995.00 5,916.00 
0.65 0.48 
0.09 0.29 
0.26 0.44 
2.78 1.98 
17.31 14.26 
35.26 11.13 
9.68 2.46 
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Appendix B. Country Sample and Time Period Covered 
1 Argentina 
2 Australia 
3 Austria 
4 Brazil 
5 Canada 
6 Chile 
7 China 
8 Colombia 
9 Czech Republic 
10 Egypt 
11 European Union 
12 Finland 
13 Hungary 
14 Iceland'" 
15 India 
16 Jamaica") 
17 Japan 
18 Kenya 
'82-92 
'82-92 
'82-92 
'82-87 
'82-92 
'87-92 
'84-92 
'82-92 
'86-92 
182-92 
'82-92 
'82-92 
'86-92 
'82-92 
'82-90 
'82-89 
'82-92 
'82-89 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Korea 
Mexico 
New Zeland 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Poland 
Senegal'"' 
Slovakia 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania ") 
Turkey 
USA 
Venezuela 
Zambia") 
Zimbabwe@) 
'82-91 
'82-92 
'82-92 
'82-89 
'82-92 
183-92 
'82-89 
'86-92 
'82-89 
'82-91 
'82-92 
'82-89 
'82-92 
'82-92 
'82-87 
'82-9 1 
'82-89 
(a)Countries not included in BERI sample. 
